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I Introduction 
On June 14, 1978 the prominent British public law scholar John Griffith stood before a 
lecture theatre at the London School of Economics and Political Science and preceded to 
argue that there is no such thing as rights. For dramatic purposes, it is tempting to imagine 
this declaration prompted audible gasps from his audience. To critique rights could be 
perceived as a form of legal blasphemy. Rights-based reasoning is present in vital civil 
instruments and pervasive moral documents which promote human welfare. The Magna 
Carta, praised by Lord Denning as “the foundation of the freedom of the individual against 
the arbitrary authority of the despot” employed rights reasoning.1 The United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights, which reflects the shared idealistic values of earth, holds 
the Guinness World Record for the most translated document. For many, rights have 
come to occupy a plane above ordinary political disputes. Those who dare to challenge 
this veneration represent a threat to human welfare. 
 
It is likely these reverent sentiments towards rights were not shared by those in 
attendance at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1978. Griffith’s 
objection to rights reasoning represented a growing belief within Political 
Constitutionalist thought which viewed rights as thinly veiled political claims. This critique 
of rights can be labeled ‘political rights theory.’ This paper will endeavour to show that 
the critical nature of political rights theory can be used to enhance the effectiveness of 
rights. If rights are approached naively their sacred status may be undermined and their 
legal strength curtailed. 
 
This endeavour will involve a close examination of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA) and a selection of the recent reform proposals mooted by the Constitutional 
Advisory Panel (CAP) Report published in November 2013. Broadly speaking, this paper 
will be split into three parts. The first part will offer an in depth analysis of political rights 
theory. It will begin outlining the political rights theory as described by Griffith. It will then 
  
1 Danny Danziger and John Gillingham 1215: The Year of Magna Carta (Simon and Schuster, 2003) at 268. 
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argue that this criticism of rights can be traced back to the ambiguity created when 
legislating for rights. It will then argue that political rights theory can be improved by an 
application of the discourse theory. This will involve examining a brief history of rights. 
 
The second part of this paper will apply political rights theory to the NZBORA and the CAP 
report’s proposals. It will begin by examining the history of the NZBORA which will reveal 
the prevalence of political rights theory in New Zealand. It will then explain how this 
cynical attitude towards rights resulted in an attempt to curtail the role of the Judiciary in 
regulating rights. However, an examination of the operative sections of the NZBORA will 
reveal that this attempt resulted in awkward drafting. It will examine how the Judiciary 
exploited this poor drafting in order to give itself a larger role in regulating rights and 
identify the consequent negative effects. It will also examine the hazards of the Attorney-
General’s role under s 7. 
 
Finally, it will examine whether the any of the proposals in the CAP report can assuage 
these problems. It will use political rights theory and the discourse thesis to assess the 
advantages and disadvantages of each proposal. It will conclude by arguing that 
philosophical theory can show that the BORA still has a role to play despite the objections 
of political rights theory. 
 
II Political Rights Theory 
The basic premises of political rights theory are simple, although their implications are 
complex. These premises are best encapsulated by John Griffith’s lecture in 1978.2 
Griffith’s critique of rights rested on two broad objections of rights: philosophical and 
political opposition.3  
 
  
2 John Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1–21. 
3 Griffith, above n 3, at 12. 
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The philosophical objection argued that rights amounted to window dressing which 
concealed the political claims of individuals and groups.4 For Griffith, the architects of bills 
of rights were simply skilled at translating political claims into abstract formulations and 
labeling them as rights.5 The political objection to rights-reasoning contends that the law 
is synonymous with politics. It is neither separate nor superior but rather “law is politics 
carried on by other means.”6  For example, the decisions of the Judiciary involve the 
settling of political disputes.  
 
 These two objections led Griffith to opine that rights should not influence the Legislature 
or the Judiciary as they “are the very questions which divide not unify opinion”.7 In the 
place of rights, Griffith advocated for the creation of situations in which groups and 
individuals may make political claims.8 According to Griffith this is not “because politicians 
are more likely to arrive at some uniquely correct answer” but because of the need for 
accountability.9  
 
Where a bill of rights is adopted, power is handed to the unelected and thus 
unaccountable judges. Politicians, on the other hand, are subject to the will of the ballot 
box and other mechanisms of political accountability such as ministerial responsibility.10 
As an aside, Griffith concedes political accountability is not perfect, but argues that 
strengthening it, along with the forum in which individuals may make political claims, is a 
more suitable route than turning to rights-based solutions.11  
 
  
4 Griffith, above n 3, at 17. 
5 Graham Gee and Gregoire Webber “What is a Political Constitution” (2010) 30 OJLR 273 at 278. 
6 John Griffith ‘The Common Law and the Political Constitution’ (2001) 117 LQR 42–67 at 64. 
7 Griffith, above n 3, at 20. 
8 Griffith, above n 3, at 18. 
9 Gee and Webber, above n 6. 
10 Griffith, above n 3, at 16. 
11 Gee and Webber, above n 6, at 279. 
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Alongside Griffith’s political rights theory developed a cultural relativist critique of rights. 
The escalation of the Cold War and decolonization gave rise to critique based on the 
theory of cultural relativism: the idea that rights should be understood in terms of a 
state’s own culture, rather than external principles.12  Under this theory, rights are 
couched as a form of cultural imperialism. The individualistic focus of rights is alien to 
many cultures resulting in an inherent conflict.13  
 
Although the focus of this paper is on rights in the context of domestic law, the cultural 
relativist critique is still relevant. First, it simply illustrates how rights can be viewed as 
being commandeered by political movements and used to advance specific agendas. For 
example, The United States has been accused of using rights selectively to create and 
maintain its hegemony.14 Second, the cultural relativist critique is particularly pertinent in 
a globalized world. New Zealand is increasingly becoming a multicultural country. In 
particular, the individualistic focus of rights conflicts with the communal element of Maori 
culture. For example, the eradication of communal Maori land tenure in favour of private 
British property rights in the nineteenth century irreversibly has damaged Maori culture.15 
A cultural relativist position is essential in maintaining a healthy cynicism towards not just 
rights, but western hegemony, which can occur through domestic legislation.  
 
Political rights theory focuses on the consequences of the political nature of rights. In 
doing so, it could be said to neglect the question as to what gives rights their political 
potential. An answer can be found by examining the inherent ambiguity of rights and 
rights-based legislation. 
  
12 Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette International Human Rights (1st ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2013) at 34. 
13 Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A political and cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of Pennyylvannia 
Press, 2002) at 39-70. 
14 Bantekas and Oette, above n 13, at 35. 
15 John McAloon “Land Ownership – Maori and Land Ownership” (13 July 2013, Te Ara – the Encylopaedia 
of New Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz>. 
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III The Ambiguity of Rights 
A A Hohfeldian analysis 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a right as a “a moral or legal entitlement to have or 
do something”.16 The vernacular definition of rights simplifies the complex connotations 
the word bears in the legal sphere. It only describes rights from the perspective of the 
person holding the rights. Wesley Hohfeld addressed the legal ambiguities of rights.17 
Hohfeld asserted that all too often the various facets and implications of rights were 
conflated resulting in erroneous conclusions. He developed a framework which separated 
rights into eight distinct concepts and grouped them into jural opposites and correlatives.  
 
A Hohfeldian analysis reveals the vast political potential of rights. In particular, the jural 
correlatives are highly relevant. They form a sort of legal version of Newton’s Third Law 
of Motion: for every right enshrined, a correlative is brought into being. When enshrining 
the freedom to expression, a state is not only bringing into existence an individual’s right 
to expression but also it is imposing a duty upon itself to uphold that right in all future 
actions. In this way a Hohfeldian lens helps emphasize the far reaching corollaries of 
enshrining rights and their extensive capacity to guide future policy. It is this capacity 
which offends political rights theory. 
B Bills of rights and the necessity for broadness  
The rights which are the focus of the essay are those contained in bills of rights. These are 
general declarations of the most important rights which govern the relationship between 
the state and its subjects in an extremely wide variety of contexts. Furthermore, people 
of radically different opinions will make use of rights. In order to cover all of these 
  
16 Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). 
17 See Wesley Hohfeld “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal 
Essays” (1919) 28 Yale LJ 721. 
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potential contexts and opinions, rights are expressed extremely broadly. Gre´goire 
Webber best describes this necessity for broadness:18 
 
“Constitutional rights are formulated in a way that finesses reasonable disagreement 
about what should be within the scope and content of the right. In this way, those 
who disagree, for example, on the permissibility of libel and pornography, abortion 
and euthanasia, State-funded religious schools and conscientious objections can 
nevertheless agree on freedom of expression, the right to life, and the freedoms of 
religion and conscience.” 
C Rights mediation 
To counterbalance their broad nature, when legislating for rights it is very common for a 
limitation mechanism to be included. This involves some form of balancing or 
proportionality test to assess when it is appropriate to limit a right. This is what Webber 
terms rights mediation.19 Earlier codifications of rights, such as the United States Bill of 
Rights 1789, neglected this component leading to rights being limited in a discretionary 
manner through judicial interpretation.20 At the other end of the spectrum some rights 
instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Namibian Constitution, micromanage the limits of rights by providing an individual 
limitation clause for every single right.21  
 
A middle ground can be found in the form of providing a general, stand-alone limitation 
clause which give loose guidance to the Judiciary when limiting any of the enshrined 
rights. This approach is epitomized by s 5 of the NZBORA which stipulated rights may only 
be subject to limits which are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
However, as will be discussed later, this sections interaction with the other operative 
  
18 Gre´goire C N Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (CUP, Cambridge 2009) 
at 1 
19 Webber, above n 19. 
20 Andrew Butler “Limiting Rights” (2002) 33 VUWLR 537 at 539-540. 
21 Andrew Butler above n 21, at 540. 
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sections is extremely unclear. These balancing mechanisms mean that the scope and 
extent of a right is largely uncertain and often decided by the Judiciary. 
D The resulting discretion 
Political rights theory abhors the large amount of discretion which is placed in the hands 
of an unelected and unaccountable judiciary as a result of this ambiguity. A salient 
example of this discretion occurred in the United States Supreme Court Decision of Roe v 
Wade.22 In this case, a woman seeking an abortion in the State of Texas sought a 
declaration that a Texan State law restricting abortion was unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court held that it was and struck down the Texan legislation. It relied on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s right of due process to derive a further right, the right to privacy, which in 
turn formed the basis for a right to have an abortion in most circumstances.  
 
The fact that no limiting mechanism is included in the United States Constitution meant 
that an enormous amount of discretion was handed to the Judiciary in defining the scope 
and limits of the right of due process. This imposed a Hohfeldian duty on all states within 
the United States to respect a women’s right to abortion. For political rights theorists, this 
judgment took a highly moral issue from the hands of the electorate and into the hands 
of an unaccountable judiciary.23  
 
IV Rights: A conversation between the rulers and the ruled 
A Limits to Griffith’s political rights theory 
Political rights theory, as posited by John Griffith, is an extreme position. It completely 
jettisons the concept of rights believing them to obfuscate the will of the common people. 
However, Griffith’s position perhaps has limited application. He was only concerned with 
examining the rights in the context of the British constitution. Also, Griffith’s ideas have 
been accused of carrying political bias. 
  
22 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973). 
23 Conor Gearty Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006) at 84. 
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Griffith represented “the last personal link with the radical socialist tradition that shaped 
the [London School of Economics] in its founding years”.24 It might be expected that the 
function of rights would align with socialist ideals. For example, labour rights can protect 
the rights of working class against the oppression by capitalists. However, a constant 
theme throughout Griffith’s work was the way in which he “subverted self-satisfied 
liberal-democratic” views and replaced them with a what-actually-happens-account.25 
Some contend this account was produced through a lens colored by Griffith’s own values.  
 
Griffith was routinely criticized in academic circles for his radical views of the Judiciary, 
believing them to be the “narrowest of social elites” that were “incapable of responding 
to the challenge of social justice that underpinned the disputes they were being asked to 
resolve”.26 His view of the Judiciary was shaped by “the common law’s traditional bias 
towards property rights protection and the fact that access to the courts had been 
restricted to all but a handful of wealthy people”.27 Thus, for Griffiths, labour rights would 
simply amount to window dressing, or perhaps even a tool for the Judiciary to creatively 
interpret labor rights in order to push a capitalist agenda. However, Griffith’s views could 
be criticized as limited due to the fact they only represent the role played by rights in a 
very specific context, namely in Britain in the Twentieth Century. A more nuanced 
approach is offered by the discourse thesis. 
B The discourse thesis: a brief history of rights 
The discourse thesis contends that rights are a product of discourse between competing 
interest groups.28 Under this view, the content and function of rights is highly dependent 
  
24 Martin Loughlin, “John Griffith obituary” (25 May 2010) The Guardian (Online ed, United Kingdom 25 May 
2010). 
25 Loughlin, above n 25. 
26 Loughlin, above n 25. 
27 Loughlin, above n 25. 
28 Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) at 217-24. 
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on the groups who are partaking in the discourse. Initially, rights were rooted in the power 
struggles between the ruling class and those they ruled. As social structures changed, and 
the ruling class began to decline, rights took on a new role. This new role is reflected in 
Griffith’s political rights theory. A cursory glance at the history of rights reveals this 
evolution. 
 
Early human communities, “aware of the necessity of protection in inimical 
surroundings”, developed systems of reciprocal protection whereby in exchange for 
power, leaders were entrusted with the responsibility of protecting their followers. 29 
Eventually, as these communities grew larger and took the form of modern states, this 
system of reciprocal protection was institutionalized in the form of rights. This dynamic 
was translated into the philosophical idea of the social contract by Thomas Hobbes.30  
 
The social contract theory posits that life without a centralized state power is brutal, nasty 
and short. In this ‘state of nature’ subjects are without rights, for example property rights 
were impossible due to the possibility of property being seized by might. To remedy this, 
an agreement or ‘social contract’ is struck between the state and its subjects. The subjects 
give up certain rights, for example the right to seize their neighbor’s property by might, 
and in return the state guarantees the protection of the remaining rights, such as the right 
the hold private property.  
 
In order for a contract to be valid, both parties must represent an intention to be bound.  
David Hume challenged the notion that the consent of the governed was actually given, 
or indeed possible.31 Under this view, the social contract is unilaterally imposed on the 
states subjects through sheer might. In response, it could be argued that the implicit 
  
29 Christian Tomuschat Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2008) at 7. 
30 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil 
(1651). 
31 David Hume “Of Civil Liberty Part II Essay XII: Of the Original Contract” (1742). 
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consent of the governed could be claimed where the subjects continue to reside in the 
state without rebelling.32 Alternatively, it has been argued that within western 
representative democracies, voting constitutes a form of implicit consent.33  
 
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky offer a cynical take on the consent of the governed 
by contending that modern news media, in particular the United States’, operates as a 
propaganda model controlled by corporate interests and the state which ‘manufactures 
consent’.34 John Livingston and Robert Thompson highlight the danger posed by the 
notion of manufactured consent in this aphoristic statement: “If the opinions of the public 
are able to control the government, these opinions must not be controlled by the 
government”.35  
 
The idea of manufactured consent poses a considerable challenge to the political school 
of rights critique. It also calls into question the validity of the social contract by eroding 
the legitimacy the consent of the governed. It therefore lessens the legitimacy of the 
alternatives to rights offered by political rights theorists such as creating further forums 
for public input. It calls into doubt the faith placed in politicians by political rights 
theorists. If politicians are susceptible or even part of the manufactured consent process, 
then they are unable to represent the will of the people as Griffith claims. Judges on the 
other hand, due to judicial immunity, could be perceived as immune to manufactured 
consent. 
 
Subjects enjoy a somewhat paradoxical relationship with their governing state. The state 
is an organization which protects the welfare of its subjects against internal and external 
  
32 see John Bookman “Locke’s Contract: Would People Consent to it?” 43 AJES 357. 
33 see CW Cassinelli “The Consent of the Governed” 12 WPQ 391. 
34 see Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media (Random House, 2010) 
35 John Livingston and Rovert Thompson The Consent of the Governed (2nd ed, Collier MacMillian, 1966) at 
457. 
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threats whilst simultaneously often posing a lethal threat to those same subjects.36 For 
evidence of this threat one only has to cast their attention to Third Reich’s systematic 
erosion of the rights of the Jewish, Romany, homosexual, dissenters and disabled. Rights 
are the discourse which navigate through this paradoxical relationship; “they are 
designed to reconcile the effectiveness of state power with the protection against that 
same state power.”37  
 
One of the earliest codifications of rights, the Magna Carta 1215, exemplifies the negation 
between an oppressive state and its subjects. In an unsuccessful bid to prevent an English 
civil war and maintain unity, and thus power, King John met with rebellious barons who 
forced the King to grant them certain rights, including an early form of due process. Over 
the next few centuries, as the feudal system was eroded and monarchies were replaced 
by republican states, the parties to this discourse shifted from conversations between 
monarchs and nobles to those between a new ruling class and the common people. This 
new ruling class, formed partly by a merchant elite, lacked the cloak of divine 
appointment with which to hide behind which resulted in a more open and frequent 
conversation. It is no surprise that the formation of the first modern republican states, 
France and the United States of America, were accompanied by the first modern 
incarnations of Bills of Rights. 
 
At this point it is arguable that rather than obfuscate the will of the people, rights 
accurately reflected the people’s desire to be protected from arbitrary state power.  
However, later developments altered the role of rights. The Nineteenth Century 
witnessed the further erosion of class divides resulting in even more fluid conversation. 
By the Twentieth Century, galvanized in part by the atrocities committed during World 
War Two, rights had become part of ordinary political parlance.38 No longer was the rights 
  
36 Tomuschat, above n 30, at 8. 
37 Tomuschat, above n 30, at 8. 
38 Bankekas and Lutz Oette, above 13, at 18-22. 
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discourse the prerogative of the ruling class, but rather now it was accessible to ordinary 
interest groups. This latter development lends credence to Griffith’s assertion that rights 
may be used as veiled political claims.  
C Rights under the discourse thesis lens 
Griffiths asserts that in the twentieth century Britain, rights were commandeered by the 
interests of the upper class to the detriment of the lower class. However, this will not 
always be the case. For example, just a century earlier, rights had been harnessed by 
labour unions in the form of labour rights. The creation of labour rights illustrates the 
discourse thesis in practice. In the nineteenth century unions of workers used their 
increasing political muscle to wrestle influence from early capitalists and enshrined this 
influence in the form of rights. In this case, it could be said that rights gain democratic 
legitimacy as they are produced as a result of genuine political struggle. 
 
However, the legitimacy of rights is degraded in the context of a power asymmetry or in 
the event that those wielding power are not willing to engage in dialogue.39 In this case a 
false consensus may be imposed resulting in a window dressing style rights. 40 At best, the 
consequence of this window dressing is that other remedies to social injustice are 
neglected, instead “endless, often individualist identity politics” are perused “rather than 
addressing the underlying structural problems”.41  
 
At worst, a Marxist reading may emerge whereby rights which challenge the ruling class 
might be “harnessed and used to serve class, economic or political interest”.42 Griffith 
would argue this occurred in context of twentieth century Britain. These fears have also 
played out elsewhere. For example, it has been argued that property rights in South Africa 
  
39 Bankekas and Lutz Oette, above 13, at 37. 
40 Bankekas and Lutz Oette, above 13, at 37. 
41 Bankekas and Lutz Oette, above 13, at 37. 
42 Bankekas and Lutz Oette, above 13, at 37. 
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were used to stifle land reforms which would benefit the poor.43 Moreover, it could be 
argued that the notion of manufactured consent suggests that there is vast potential for 
these fears to continue to play out in the western democratic world. 
 
In summary, the discourse thesis offers a more nuanced and realistic account of rights. 
Griffith’s analysis of rights is limited to the context of the United Kingdom in the twentieth 
century. The discourse thesis is enduring and applicable throughout time. The notion of 
manufactured consent suggests that Griffith’s conclusion that rights can obfuscate the 
will of people is still correct, but the path to this conclusion is different. 
 
V The history of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A long and 
tortuous journey 
The history of the NZBORA reveals that political rights theory has dominated both the 
public and academic sphere. The circumstances of its eventual enactment illustrates and 
exemplifies the discourse thesis in operation. Almost thirty years prior to the enactment 
of the NZBORA, a bill of rights was almost enacted. In 1951, the transition of the New 
Zealand Government from a bicameral to unicameral House prompted concerns 
regarding the concentration of power and the subsequent potential for the tyranny of the 
majority.44 In response to these concerns the National Party proposed an unentrenched, 
non-supreme bill of rights in 1963.45 However, a year later the Parliamentary 
Constitutional Reform Committee recommended against the enactment of a bill of rights 
due to a lack of support among New Zealand society as a whole.46  
 
  
43 M Mutua, Human Rights: A political and cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of Pennyylvannia Press, 
2002) at 142-144. 
44 David Erdos Delegating Rights Protection (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 3. 
45 Ronagh McQuigg Bills of Rights: A comparative Perspective (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2014) at 32. 
46 McQuigg, above n 46, at 32. 
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The most vehement opposition came from academic circles. It was spearheaded by an 
unlikely figure, Geoffrey Palmer who, rather ironically, later became the chief architect of 
BORA. In 1968, Palmer presented four main objections to the notion of a supreme bill of 
rights which could strike down legislation.47  
 
First, he reproached the way judges would be launched into a political role for which they 
lacked the ability and the desire.48 The first part of this objection, the lack of Judiciary’s 
ability to deal with political issues, is a fundamental tenet of political critical rights theory. 
Judges represent a narrow demographic and therefore are without the political mandate, 
and indeed understanding, to deal with political issues. However, Palmer’s assertion that 
the Judiciary was not “adventuresome enough” to fulfill this function is curious.49 It could 
be argued that this derogates from the political rights theory’s persuasiveness in a New 
Zealand context. If our Judiciary lacks an adventurous disposition then could be said that 
their application of rights would cautious; careful not to stray into political territory. 
Regardless, Palmer did not want to provide a platform for an adventurous judicial culture 
to develop. 
 
Second, Palmer believed a bill of rights would risk the public’s respect of the judicial 
system by inviting partisan criticism.50 This objection plays on the political rights theory 
premise that law is synonymous with politics. In the event of a supreme bill of rights, and 
subsequent political decisions, it would become apparent to the public that the law was 
becoming just another means of carrying out politics. The overt political appointment of 
United States Supreme Court Justices is an example of this getting out of hand. 
 
  
47 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?” in Kenneth Keith (ed.) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet 
& Maxwell, Wellington 1968). 
48 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?”, above n 48, at 107. 
49 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?”, above n 48, at 126. 
50 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?”, above n 48, at 127. 
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Third, Palmer believed there was simply no need for a bill of rights due to the small and 
sensitive political system of New Zealand.51 This argument is double sided. It is true that 
a small and sensitive system has the capacity to respond civil rights violations as they 
arise. However, it is also true that small political system could be hijacked by an extremist 
group. However, Palmer likely dismissed this threat for reasons enumerated in his final 
objection. 
 
Palmer highlighted a culture within New Zealand politics which was more concerned with 
pragmatism than principle. Palmer explained that, as New Zealand was free of the 
“conflict which is often a pre-requisite for unreasonable curtailment of civil rights by 
government”, its citizens were more concerned about the “guaranteed price for 
butterfat” rather than theoretical deficiencies in civil liberties.52  He also noted that New 
Zealand was relatively tolerant of deficiencies in civil liberties issues such as freedom of 
expression and gender based discrimination.53 It could be argued that this tolerance and 
apathy is generational. The CAP reported, in a rare finding of a consensus, that the public 
viewed the NZBORA as “a fundamental and enduring part of [New Zealand’s] 
constitutional arrangements”.54 In 1999, Philip Joseph commented that the NZBORA had 
been successful in “engendering broad acceptance of constitutional rights among the 
citizenry”.55 It is clear that politics played a key role in dispelling this public suspicion 
towards rights. 
 
After the failed attempt to enact a bill of rights in 1963, Palmer’s assertion of public apathy 
was proven true over the next 15 years. Negligible attention was given to the matter.56 
  
51 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?”, above n 48, at 107. 
52 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?”, above n 48, at 130-131. 
53 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?”, above n 48, at 130-131. 
54 Constitutional Advisory Panel, New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on the Conversation (Ministry of 
Justice, November 2013) at 53. 
55 Phillip Joseph, “New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Experience” in Philip Alston (ed) Promoting Human Rights 
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56 McQuigg, above n 46, at 34. 
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Enter Prime Minister Robert Muldoon who, during the tail-end of his 1975-1984 
administration, stretched executive powers to the extent that many considered him to be 
in breach of the separation of powers doctrine.57 The policies in question were of a 
partisan nature; Muldoon refused to carry out the wishes of the Prime Minister elect 
leading to a rare New Zealand constitutional crisis.58 These events inspired the Labour 
Party, including the reformed Geoffrey Palmer, to advocate for a bill of rights in order to 
restrain executive powers.59  
 
The Labour Party came to power in 1984 with a bill of rights forming part of their election 
manifesto.60 This begun what Palmer dubbed, “a long and tortuous” journey towards the 
enactment of the NZBORA.61 The reason for this difficulty was the wide acceptance of 
political rights theory in New Zealand. Indeed, even within the Labour party ranks there 
was some opposition to a supreme bill of rights which Michael Taggart described as 
“vestiges of the political left’s distrust of the judicial branch.”62 John Griffith’s view of the 
Judiciary as the narrowest class of social elites reflects this distrust. However, it is arguable 
that there is something distinctly British about this distrust given the United Kingdom’s 
longstanding and rigid class system. Although, it is possible the Labour politicians in 




57 McQuigg, above n 46, at 34-35. 
58 See Fizgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615. 
59 McQuigg, above n 46, at 35. 
60 McQuigg, above n 46, at 35. 
61 Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand’s Constitution in Crisis (John McIndoe, Dunedin, 1992) at 51. 
62 Michael Taggart,”Tugging on Superman’s Cape: Lessons from Experience with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990” in Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Practice and Principles (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 1988) at 39. 
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A White Paper on the subject of a New Zealand bill of rights, was produced in 1986 which 
proposed a supreme and entrenched bill of rights.63 The Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee heard 431 public submissions on the White Paper and found “a clear majority 
were opposed to the bill of rights proposal”.64 The opposing submissions echoed the 
political rights theory objections of Palmer almost 30 years earlier: it would provide too 
much power to an unelected and unaccountable judiciary.65 Accordingly, the Select 
Committee recommended that the proposals not be carried out. It should be noted that 
similar objections are noted in the CAP report.66 This indicates that many still subscribe 
to the political rights theory within New Zealand. Although, given the aforementioned 
overall support for the NZBORA noted in the CAP report, it seems they no longer form the 
majority.  
 
Faced with mounting opposition, Palmer suggested a diluted bill of rights which was 
unentrenched and non-supreme.67 After the addition of s 4 during its passage through 
parliament the NZBORA was enacted in 1990. The strange origins of the NZBORA are best 
summarized by Paul Risworth:68 
 
“[The NZBORA] was enacted as a party political measure rather than unanimously. 
There was no ground-swell of public support for it; indeed, it is possible that public 
opinion was against it.” 
 
This prompts the question as to what exactly the unconventional passage of the NZBORA 
represented:  whether the NZBORA represented a discourse between the state and its 
subjects, whether it represented rights being commandeered by political interests, or 
  
63 Geoffrey Palmer A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (1985)  
64 Justice and Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into the White Paper: A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1986) 
65 McQuigg above n 46 , at 37. 
66 Constitutional Advisory Panel, above n 55, at 55. 
67 McQuigg above n 46 , at 39 
68 Paul Risworth “The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: The first fifteen months” in Essays on the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990  (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland 1992) at 7-8. 
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even amounted to an example of manufactured consent. To an extent, an argument could 
be made for each of these interpretations. 
 
The history and passage of the NZBORA illustrates the discourse thesis in operation. 
Disregarding the symbolic role of the Governor-General, the closest embodiment to the 
state is the executive. The actions of the Muldoon government revealed that the 
executive had the capacity to, and indeed the inclination, to act illegally.69 It was possible 
that a future government could act in a similar way to the detriment of its citizens. Thus 
the NZBORA act was enacted to provide a safeguard for New Zealanders. 
 
The fact that the NZBORA was passed in the face of public opposition but now enjoys 
considerable acceptance is a curious phenomenon. It could be argued that NZBORA 
simply achieved one of its purposes; to promote civil and political liberties and general 
constitutional principles.70 This role was necessary as the Law Reform Select committee 
concluded that there “was a lack of knowledge generally of the issues under 
consideration’.71  
 
A more cynical interpretation might view this as an example of manufactured consent. In 
an odd case of persuaded rights protection, the government manipulated the New 
Zealand public from of a position of tolerance of civil infringements to one which supports 
the principles of rights protection. This argument is supported by the partisan backdrop 
to the enactment NZBORA. Conor Gearty has hinted at the possibility of progressives who 
have lost confidence in the ability to pitch their policies to the public using rights as a 
short-cut to implement them.72 Of course this line of argument does pose a danger of 
straying into conspiracy terrain. The public’s new acceptance of rights could simply 
  
69 The illegality of Muldoon’s actions were established in Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615. 
70 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title. 
71 Justice and Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into the White Paper: A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1986) 
at 4. 
72 Gearty, above n 24, at 80. 
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indicate a generational shift. Nonetheless, this analysis offers an interesting account of 
how can rights potentially function. 
 
Immediately after the NZBORA was passed, it received a distinct lack of attention due to 
the perception that it was a ‘toothless document’.73 It was the Judiciary’s interpretation 
of the NZBORA which ensured it was to have substantial legal impact and become “one 
of the most cited statutes” in New Zealand.74 It could be argued that this common law 
development represents the greatest fear of the political rights theorist. This will be 
discussed in further detail in the context of the NZBORA’s operative sections. 
 
VI The Backdrop to the Constitutional Advisory Panel’s Report on the 
NZBORA 
Much like the initial impetus for the enactment of the NZBORA, the origins of the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel can be subject to different interpretations. The result is 
radically different depending on whether political rights theory or the discourse theory is 
applied. The Constitutional Advisory Panel (the CAP) was established per a supply and 
confidence agreement between the National Party and the Maori Party in 2008.75 The 
National Party did not obtain an outright majority in the 2008 elections. It therefore 
required the support of the minor parties. In exchange for the Maori Party’s support, the 
National Party agreed to undertake a consideration of constitutional issues.  
 
The CAP was assigned to carry out this role. It was tasked with stimulating debate on the 
matter, garnering public opinion. It was to “report to Ministers with advice on the topics, 
including any broad consensus where further work is recommended”.76 This gives the CAP 
the real potential to influence policy.  
  
73 Taggart, above n 63, at 268. (Ronagh page 104) 
74 Erdos, above n 45, at 100. 
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A political rights theorist may view this as a case of the Maori Party, due to its limited 
political muscle, attempting to use constitutional matters, including rights, as a 
convenient short-cut in order to advance its personal agenda. Alternatively, it could be 
perceived as the National Party implementing window dressing which neglects to address 
the underlying issues with which the Maori agenda is concerned with.  
 
Conversely, a subscriber to the discourse thesis would view the CAP report favorably. This 
engagement with the public should be commended. In particular, with regards to the 
CAP’s role in examining the NZBORA, it could be perceived as an overt and formalized 
method of discourse between the state and its subjects as to how best balance the power 
of the state. Historically, people have had to struggle for this conversation, but here the 
public was being proactively consulted. However, it remains to be seen whether the 
public’s opinion will actually be implemented. A public consensus on matters concerning 
constitutional matters was not forthcoming. 
 
None of the proposals regarding the NZBORA reflected public consensus. As a result the 
recommendations of the CAP did not go beyond calls for further discussion. The paper 
separates the proposals into two distinct classes. First, it examines proposals which would 
improve compliance with the standards set by the NZBORA. Second, it examines a range 
of proposed rights which could be added to the NZBORA. Before examining these 
proposals, it is first necessary to outline the operative sections of the NZBORA and their 
subsequent judicial application. This will ensure the full ramifications of the proposals are 
understood.  
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VII The Operative Sections of NZBORA 
A Sections 4, 5 and 6 
1 Drafting Ambiguities 
The operative sections which define the judicial application of the NZBORA are found in 
ss 4, 5 and 6. The interrelationship between these sections is awkward and has been 
subject to much academic criticism. Importantly, for the political rights theorists, this 
awkwardness has given a large amount of discretion to the Judiciary in developing the 
powers of the NZBORA. 
 
Section 4 makes explicit that the Judiciary cannot rely on rights within NZBORA in order 
to strike down other legislation.77 This is a direct result of the concerns grounded in 
political rights raised during the passage of the NZBORA. This section has come under 
criticism for preserving the concentration of power which NZBORA was supposed to 
dilute. Geoffrey Leane comments that “the fox, then, is still guarding the hen house” since 
“[r]ights are still vulnerable to something very close to legally unlimited 
majoritarianism”.78 However, the adoption of the Mixed Member Proportional voting 
system in 1996 system has helped to assuage these fears by ensuring that majority 
governments are extremely rare. To date, no single party has gained an outright majority 
in an election. 
 
Section 5 represents a limiting mechanism designed to address the ambiguity of rights. 
Section 5 provides that the rights within the NZBORA “may be only subject to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society” [emphasis added]. When juxtaposed with s 4, s 5 is arguably rendered 
  
77 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,  s 4(a). 
78 Geoffrey Leane, “Enacting Bills of Rights: Canada and the Curious Case of New Zealand’s ‘Thin’ 
Democracy” (2004) 26 HRQ 152 at 172. 
24 Dismantling Rights: Political Rights Theory and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
meaningless.79 Section 5 requires limits to rights are required to be prescribed by law, but 
if a limit has been prescribed by law then s 4 is engaged and the legal limit in question 
trumps the NZBORA. This could not have been the intention of parliament; however such 
cumbersome drafting invites creative judicial interpretation. 
 
Section 6 provides the most potential for judicial creativity. It provides that “where an 
enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with [the rights in NZBORA], that 
meaning shall be preferred”. This gives the Judiciary explicit powers to use rights to colour 
their interpretation of statutes. Without it the NZBORA would be toothless and weighed 
down by s 4. It is likely s 6 was a compromise included as a result of stripping the NZBORA 
of is intended supreme status.  
 
The tension between s 6 and s 4 is palpable. Andrew Butler describes this interaction 
between these two sections as creating “a difficult Janus-like role for the Courts”.80 
Section 6 appears to imply that the Court is required to serve as the protector of rights 
whilst s 4 demands they yield when parliament decides to breach those rights. This fosters 
a public expectation of rights protection which the courts may powerless to fulfill.  
 
To resolve this tension, Butler contends that statutory interpretation of ss 4 and 6 may 
appear arbitrary: judges who value rights-protection will stretch interpretation towards s 
6, whereas those who believe in a more pragmatic and less principled approach will lean 
on s 4.81 In other words decisions pertaining to rights protection may be decided by 
person values.  
 
  
79 Paul Risworth, “Affirming the Fundamental Values of the Nation: How the Bills of Rights and the Human 
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Britian” (1997) 17 OJLS 323 at 337. 
81 Butler, above n 81, at 327. 
25 Dismantling Rights: Political Rights Theory and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
The problems presented by the relationship between ss 4, 5 and 6 undoubtedly stem from 
the fact that s 4 was inserted late into the Bill as a response to the prevalence of political 
rights theory during the process of enacting the NZBORA. It is ironic that s 4, which was 
designed to limit the influence of judges in the field of rights, essentially provided the 
Judiciary with a platform to shape the way right-based legislation operates in New 
Zealand. As Anna Adams remarked, the NZBORA has “constitutional potential” due to the 
fact that “minimal changes in the drafting of the Bill’s operational sections had been made 
to reflect its transition from entrenched supreme law to ordinary statute” resulting in an 
Act which was “ambiguous and open to creative interpretation”.82 
 
Perhaps most surprisingly, this awkward drafting was not addressed by the CAP report. It 
could be argued that this is an indication that the public and the members of the Panel 
are content with the active role the Judiciary has been given in shaping the role of the 
NZBORA. The CAP report simply concluded that “where reasonably possible, the Judiciary 
must apply laws in a way that is consistent with the [NZBORA]”.83 This describes the effect 
of s 6 and “where reasonably possible” describes the limit imposed by s 4. However, the  
CAP report disregards the effect the s 5, its ambiguous relationship with ss 4 and 6, and 
the subsequent judicial application. 
2 The Courts Interpretation 
Many have criticized the NZBORA for its perceived impotency. Leane described it at the 
time of its enactment as a bill of rights “of the weakest kind”.84 More recently,  Gearty 
labeled it as “grudging and minimalist in its use of rights language”.85 However, contrary 
to these opinions, the Act itself, whether intended or not, is drafted in an ambiguous 
fashion which provides the Court with the discretion to give it some real bite.  
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The leading judgment on the operative sections of the NZBORA is the Supreme Court 
decision of Hansen v The Queen.86 The majority prescribed a method for applying the 
operative sections, referred herein as the ‘Hansen test’.87 Where a prima facie conflict 
with a right is present s 5 is applied to determine whether the right is demonstrably 
justified. If it is not, then s 6 will be engaged; that is an interpretation which preserves 
the right, or limits it to a justifiable extent, will be adopted. If this is not possible then s 4 
applies and the inconsistent provision prevails.  
 
A notable feature of the Hansen test is that s 6 is not engaged until after s 5 is applied. 
This raises the potential of s 6 being neglected altogether. Consider an enactment which 
prima facie limits a right under the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, but it could 
be possible to stretch its interpretation via s 6 so as to prevent this limitation. If the 
prima facie limit is deemed demonstrably justified under s 5 there is no need to apply s 
6 and the limit applies. 
 
This problem is compounded by the fact that s 5 offers a large amount of discretion. 
Applying s 5 involves considering how important the government’s objective is behind 
the limiting measures, whether the limiting measure is rationally connected to this 
objective and whether the limiting measure is proportionate. 88 This test has been 
described as a “value judgment”.89 Handing over this kind of personal discretion to 
judges is the grand fear of political rights theorists.  
The majority in Hansen was split as to whether the limit in question was demonstrably 
justified. The provision in question placed a persuasive burden upon the accused to 
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show he did not possess cannabis for the purpose of supply.90 The accused argued that 
it would be consistent with the right to be presumed innocent, per s 25(c) of the 
NZBORA, to interpret the provision as merely imposing an evidentiary burden. 
 
Justice Blanchard applied the first limb of the Hansen test and found that the limit 
placed on the right to be presumed innocent by a persuasive burden was demonstrably 
justified.91 In finding this, Justice Blanchard relied on the policy considerations which 
underpinned the Misuse of Drugs Act provision, namely that a net benefit of social good 
was provided by expediting drug prosecutions.92 For an old school political rights 
theorist like Griffith, Justice Blanchard would earn plaudits as he simply regurgitated the 
policy which informed the limiting provision. Such policy would be perceived as 
representing the will of the people as expressed through the Legislature. 
 
Conversely, Justices Tipping and McGrath deemed that the objective of the limiting 
provisions was worthy, but the means to achieve that limit was not proportionate. 
Justice Anderson went even further by finding that the objective of the limiting 
provision was not sufficient.93 Nonetheless, all three justices found that the provision 
was clearly worded so as to impose a persuasive burden, thus s 4 applied. Nonetheless, 
the Justices use of s 5 in order to undermine the policy of the government based on 
their own personal views would concern political rights thought. If the wording of 
limiting provision were less clear it is conceivable that they might have completely 
derogated the will of the Legislature in a similar fashion to the United States Supreme 
Court in Roe v Wade. 
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The majority’s reasoning for readily engaging s 5 was offered by Justice Tipping. He 
contended that, through s 5, Parliament had provided the courts with the mandate to 
ascertain whether any limitations which Parliament placed on rights were justified.94 
Justice Tipping relied on the wording ‘demonstrably justified’ within s 5, asserting that this 
denoted that the limits prescribed by parliament had be shown to be justified outside of 
Parliament that is, by the courts.95  
 
This is a prime example of the potential for creative interpretation which the ambiguity 
of the operative sections provides. Justice Tipping appeared concerned to protect rights 
and, with all due respect, his reasoning appears to have worked backwards from there. 
The history of the NZBORA and the way it was tempered by political rights theory, suggest 
that this was not what parliament intended. It is likely that ‘demonstrably’ was simply 
included to ensure that a high threshold for the limitation of rights was set. These are the 
sentiments present in Chief Justice Elias’ minority judgment. She simply held that s 5 was 
directed at Parliament when making laws rather than as an aid for statutory 
interpretation. 96 Under Elias’ version of the Hansen test, an interpretation of the 
provision in question which does not limit right, or limits it to a justifiable extent, should 
be preferred per s 6. If this is not tenable, then s 4 applies and the right is limited in 
accordance with Parliament’s clear intent. The application of s 5 is exclusively a 
consideration for parliament when making laws and the Attorney-General in his or her 
application of s 7. 
B Section 7 
Section 7 requires the Attorney-General to flag any provision of a new bill introduced into 
Parliament “that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights” contained in the 
NZBORA. Geoffrey Palmer asserts that s 7 is “not a matter of political judgment, but of 
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formal legal opinion”.97 This is debatable. The use of the word ‘appears’ conveys a large 
amount of discretion. It could be argued that it conveys a subjective standard. In other 
words it must appear inconsistent in the eyes of the Attorney-General. Furthermore, a s 
7 analysis may involve the use of s 5. If bill does indeed infringe a right, it could be argued 
it is demonstrably justifiable and therefore does not appear to infringe the rights. 
 
The s 7 report is undertaken by the Attorney-General on the advice of the Ministry of 
Justice. Both form part of the Executive and, as such, have a vested interest in supporting 
the passage of government legislation. It could be argued that the discretion granted by 
s 7 leaves open the possibility of political bias.  Roughly the same amount of government 
and non-government bills have been vetted under s 7, suggesting that this role has been 
carried out impartially.98 However, this does not discount the fact that there have been 
bills which were not vetoed under s 7 despite clearly appearing to be inconsistent. 
 
The Electoral Finance Act 2007 prima facie limited the freedom of expression, but a s 7 
report was not issued in respect of its Bill. The Attorney General found the limit 
demonstrably justified per s 5, although the issue was “finely balanced”.99 Where such an 
event occurs, Carolyn Archer and Gaze Burt offer a provoking analysis: 100  
 
“The Attorney-General’s failure to bring to the attention of the House a breach of the 
Bill of Rights Act, perhaps inadvertently, abdicates the responsibility of weighing up 
legislative facts and deciding questions of policy, to the Judiciary.” 
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However, this theory is brought into doubt by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Boscawen 
v Attorney-General. 101 The decision concerned the Attorney-General’s failure to issue a s 
7 report in relation to the Electoral Finance Bill. The appellants sought a declaration that 
the Attorney-General breached s 7 by failing to flag provisions of the Bill that appeared to 
be inconsistent with the NZBORA.  
 
Justice O’Regan held that, since the Attorney-General’s duty under s 7 was by nature 
parliamentary and was exercised in good faith, it would be contrary to the principle of 
comity for the Court to review it. 102 Furthermore, Justice O’Regan observed that the 
Judiciary is poorly placed to undertake a broad review of a whole piece of legislation and 
in any event such a review could delay the legislative process and involve the courts in 
active parliamentary debate.103 
 
This decision confirms that the courts are not willing to take on Archer’s alleged 
abdication of responsibility by the Attorney-General. Section 7 was deemed the Attorney-
General’s exclusive territory. This raises an obvious problem. The Attorney-General, 
motivated by political leanings, could simply lean on s 5 and declare the limit to be 
demonstrably justified. Indeed, Justice O’Regan confirmed that s 5 confers a large amount 
of discretion to the Attorney-General by holding that opinions as to whether a particular 
restriction was demonstrably justified might legitimately vary.104 
 
Arguably, Hansen offers a partial solution. The first limb of Hansen test provides the 
Judiciary with opportunity to apply s 5. This gives the Judiciary the option to state that a 
limit is not demonstrably justified in an official forum. This could be perceived as an 
implied declaration of inconsistency. However, if the limiting provision wording is clear 
then the Judiciary is bound to apply it per s 4. Regardless, the consequences of a limitation 
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of rights being highlighted by the Judiciary are clear.  Even though Justice O’Regan 
declined to employ an s 5 analysis in Boscawen, the effect of giving judicial attention to a 
potentially unjustifiable limit to freedom of expression was significant. Although, the 
Electoral Finance Act 2007 was poorly drafted and riddled with implementation issues, it 
could be argued that, the judicial attention given to its potential limit on freedom of 
expression contributed to its eventual repeal in 2009. The decision in Hansen provides the 
Judiciary to go step further, from identifying a potential limit to commenting on whether 
it is demonstrably justifiable. 
 
However this role played by the Judiciary is problematic according to political rights 
theory. As already noted, it involves the Judiciary making political arguments grounded in 
personal opinion. It also raises an issue of equal access to justice. This concern was raised 
during the enactment of the NZBORA.105 The rights in NZBORA apply to legal personalities 
where possible.106 The limit to freedom of expression in the Electoral Finance Act only 
received judicial attention because litigation was brought against the Attorney-General 
by the leaders of lobby organizations and a political party.107 As noted, the capacity exists 
for the Attorney-General to approach s 7 in a partisan manner. In this event, the prime 
method of rights enforcement is litigation. Unlike corporations and organizations like 
those in Boscawen, ordinary people do not have the financial backing to instigate 
litigation. This could mean that the developed of rights could be skewed in favour of those 
with deeper pockets. 
 
Boscawen represents what Gearty labels a depressing irony of rights.108 The policy 
rationale behind the Electoral Finance Act was to prevent the influx on money flooding 
into politics and drowning out the voice of the poor. The NZBORA could be said to have 
had similar objectives. The NZBORA is designed to protect minorities. The poor could be 
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couched as a political minority due to their lack of influence in policy. This makes the 
result of Boscawen curious. The right to freedom of expression contributed to the repeal 
of an Act which was, ultimately, aimed at protecting the common peoples’ political 
expression. 
C Summary: the problem with the operative sections 
The drafting history of the NZBORA, namely its abrupt demotion from supreme law status, 
resulted in confusingly drafted operative sections. The insertion of s 4 was intended to 
remove power from the hands of the Judiciary. However, to ensure the NZBORA was not 
completely irrelevant, s 6 was included. Furthermore, s 5 was included to account for the 
inherent ambiguity of rights and mediate limitations. The resulting ambiguity, somewhat 
ironically considering the prevalence of political right concerns, gave the Judiciary a large 
amount of discretion to shape the development of rights law. 
 
Despite Palmer’s assertion that the Judiciary lacked the disposition and desire to be 
thrust into a political role by rights, when presented with the opportunity they seem to 
not have been able to help themselves. The Hansen test, as prescribed by the majority 
allows, the Judiciary to wade into political debates. This development leaves the 
Judiciary vulnerable to political critique which detracts from its public veneration as an 
impartial disputes resolver.  
 
Furthermore, as Justice Blanchard’s approach demonstrates, the Hansen test can be 
used to render the rights in the NZBORA completely irrelevant.  It presents the 
opportunity for judges to simply regurgitate policy via s 5 and totally neglect s 6, the 
provision which provides NZBORA its only power. Similarly, Boscawen confirms that the 
Attorney-General may use his subjective, often political, personal view to refuse to flag 
a bill under s 7. Subsequently, the only certain means of right enforcement is a weak 
and expensive one. It must occur through litigation in the form of a tangential finding by 
the Judiciary that a limit to a right is not demonstrably justified.  
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VIII The CAP’s Proposals 
A A role for rights today 
Before considering the proposals mooted in the CAP report, it should be ascertained 
whether rights should have a role to play in New Zealand today. According Griffith’s 
political rights theory they should not. Even the Judiciary’s capacity to find that a provision 
was unjustifiably limited a right is a concern due to the political role it gives judges and 
the fact it can it can only be exploited by those able to afford litigation. Orthodox political 
rights theory would advocate for the NZBORA’s repeal. 
 
However, Griffith’s lecture took place over thirty years ago.109 At this time rights-based 
reasoning was at a crossroads. There was a debate raging within countries like the United 
Kingdom as to whether a bill of rights should be adopted. Griffith’s lecture in 1978 was a 
response to the emerging British support for rights.  110 Today, rights-based reasoning 
appears to have won out. Every single western democracy, with the exception of 
Australia, has adopted a bill of rights in one form or another. The CAP report confirmed a 
broad acceptance of rights exists in New Zealand.111 This has resulted in an evolution of 
political rights reasoning, one which is resigned to the pervasiveness of rights based 
reasoning but is geared at minimizing rights’ infringement into politics. The most lucid 
explanation of this new wave of political critical rights theory is offered by Connor 
Gearty.112 
 
Gearty, a professor from the London School of Economics and Political Science, has 
continued the tradition of political rights theory established by Griffith. Like Geoffrey 
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Palmer’s views on the New Zealand bill of rights proposal in 1963, Gearty was initially 
opposed to the enactment of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 and advocated 
for its repeal.113 This illustrates his careful approach towards rights. He described the 
enactment of a supreme bill of rights as a “Faustian bargain”. 114 
 
Gearty believes that in our post-religious and post-socialist culture, rights have the 
capacity to “provide a language for the voiceless, the vulnerable and the marginalized” 
who “have no other means of getting the public’s attention”.115 This is relevant even in 
Western countries with a rich tradition of welfare and democracy as rights can guide these 
“cultures further along the paths of civility and humanity”.116 To evidence this Gearty 
points to landmark desegregation and civil rights decisions in the United States Supreme 
Court which were guided by the United States Bill of Rights.117 Similar, but less 
monumental, developments have arisen in the New Zealand context.118 Some may view 
these advancements as judicial activism. Griffith would certainly blanch at the idea of 
unelected judges holding sway in such politically charged matters. 
 
These benefits come at a cost. Gearty highlights the over-legalization of politics and the 
resultant uncertainty produced by bills of rights as “the public must wait to learn the fate 
of legislative initiatives”.119 He notes the potential to use rights as a short-cut for 
implementing policy. 120 He uses Roe v Wade as an example of a judicial ruling which took 
a decision of moral importance away from the people at large and handed to the 
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unelected judiciary.121 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, he highlights the 
compromise to equal access to justice produced by rights due to the necessity of 
litigation.122 
 
Despite these negatives, Gearty states that to eliminate rights would make a “strong 
negative statement” which “our liberal culture cannot afford to do.”123 His solution is the 
United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the UKHRA’).124  
B The British Approach 
Section 3 of the UKHRA is equivalent to s 6 of the NZBORA; it requires a rights-friendly 
interpretation of legislation to be favored. The UKHRA incorporates most of rights in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) and its rights limiting mechanism.125 
The ECHR micromanages limitations to every single right.126 This means that British judges 
do not enjoy the same freedom as New Zealand judges when assessing the limitation of 
rights through s 5 of the NZBORA. Where a consistent interpretation is impossible, s 4 of 
the UKHRA prescribes the higher courts with the power to issue a declaration of 
incompatibility. The effect of this does not invalidate the legislation, but s 10 does give 
the relevant minister an avenue to fast-track an amendment which would remove the 
incompatibility.  
 
There are several things to note when comparing the NZBORA and the UKHRA. S 4 of the 
UKHRA means that the Judiciary is clearly assigned the power to review and comment on 
legislation which limits rights. The UK Parliament were more likely to assign this power 
than New Zealand’s because of the ECHR’s micromanagement of permissible limits to 
  
121 Gearty, above n 113, at 84. 
122 Gearty, above n 113, at 82. 
123 Gearty, above n 113, at 92. 
124 Gearty, above n 113, at 88-93. 
125 United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998, s 2. 
126 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, United Kingdom, 
(signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), art 18. 
36 Dismantling Rights: Political Rights Theory and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
rights as compared to the large discretion provided by s 5 of the NZBORA. It is arguable 
that with the first limb of the Hansen test, the New Zealand Judiciary has seized upon the 
ambiguity of NZBORA and claimed this power itself. Furthermore this power is wider in 
scope due to the general nature of s 5.  
 
As this is a common law development, as opposed to an explicit declaration by 
Parliament, a declaration of an unjustifiable limit by New Zealand judges carries less 
political weight than the British declaration of inconsistency. However there is nothing to 
compel the government to use s 10, or indeed acknowledge a declaration of 
incompatibility bar political compulsion. However, similar political compulsion exists 
where the New Zealand courts find a limit to a right unjustified per the first limb of the 
Hansen test. Justice McGrath held that it results in a “constitutional expectation” that 
there will be a reappraisal of the objectives of the offending measures and the means by 
which it was implemented in the legislation.127 It should be noted that the UKHRA does 
provide British courts with various remedies where public authorities are deemed to have 
infringed rights. 128 However, there is nothing in the NZBORA which prohibits the courts 
from imposing such remedies. In fact, the New Zealand court has created a remedy in the 
event of rights being breached.129  
 
Therefore, there is very little difference between how the NZBORA and the UKHRA 
function. The only difference is that UKHRA is explicit that the Judiciary has the ability to 
review the degree to which an enactment complies with rights and issue remedies where 
rights have been breached whilst the New Zealand has read in these powers. If anything, 
s 5 confers more discretion to New Zealand judges in protecting rights. Accordingly, it is 
surprising to note Gearty supports the UKHRA but criticizes the NZBORA as weak since it 
restricts judicial power in relation to rights to one of “mere interpretation”.130 
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C The CAP’s Proposals: Increasing Compliance with the NZBORA 
 
The CAP report discusses two avenues which could resolve the ambiguity surrounding the 
operative sections: increasing the powers of the Judiciary or increasing the powers of the 
Legislature. To be clear, the report did not acknowledge the ambiguity surrounding the 
operative sections. However, these avenues could be used to resolve this ambiguity. 
 
The first avenue is to increase the role of the Judiciary. It proposed three ways of achieving 
this. First was to grant the ability for the Judiciary to strike down inconsistent legislation 
to the effect it becomes unenforceable.131 Many nations have adopted a supreme bill of 
rights whereby the Judiciary can strike down legislation if rights-inconsistency is found.132 
The Report presented arguments for and against this measure. It accurately reflected the 
Faustian bargain being struck. 
 
Those supporting supreme rights argued that judges, as independent, impartial and fair 
decision makers with human rights expertise, were better equipped to protect minority 
rights than majoritarian parliaments.133 The demographic make-up of the Judiciary casts 
doubt on this argument. They also argued that the Judiciary could provide an independent 
check on Parliament.134  
 
Those against supreme rights argued parliamentary sovereignty must be preserved on the 
basis that it has a democratic mandate and can best gage public opinion.135 They also 
highlighted the risk of politicizing judicial appointments.136 A political rights theory 
argument omitted was the fact that the law would become uncertain if it were capable of 
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being struck down. However, on the whole, the Report does a good job of reflecting many 
of the concerns of political rights theorists. 
 
The second method of increasing judicial powers discussed was the ability for the 
Judiciary to declare legislation inconsistent with BORA and a subsequent requirement for 
the Government to respond. 137 This is analogous to the UKHRA, except it would go a step 
further by requiring Parliament to respond. This would increase the Judiciary’s powers as 
established in Hansen. However, the power is potentially toothless; the government could 
simply invoke s 5 by asserting the relevant limit was ‘demonstrably justified’. Additionally, 
this amendment would not address many of the concerns of political right theory 
discussed throughout this paper. For example, it will still launch the Judiciary into an 
uncomfortable political position, personal opinions could be exercised through the first 
limb of the Hansen test, legislation would be rendered uncertain, and, perhaps most 
significantly, equal access to justice would be compromised.  
 
Finally, the Canadian model was discussed.138 This involves granting rights a supreme 
status, but with a caveat. Canada has adopted a unique model whereby legislation may 
be struck down unless the legislation includes a “notwithstanding” clause.  139 This grants 
the inconsistent legislation immunity from judicial critique for 5 years, at which point a 
notwithstanding clause may be enacted again. This clause preserves parliamentary 
sovereignty whilst maintaining public accountability when or if the Legislature decides to 
limit rights. It has seldom been used by the Canadian Legislature, indicating public 
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However, Gearty interprets this lack of use as the Judiciary lording over the Legislature. 
He argues that it appears “the pressure not to defy judicial versions of rights has proved 
next to impossible to resist” and thus the notwithstanding clause fails to operate as a 
“political counterweight to the court’s version of right and wrong”.140 Consequently, this 
option succumbs to all the shortcomings of supreme rights legislation. 
 
The second avenue discussed was to increase the role of the Legislature. It is arguably 
the preferable one. The Report noted that Parliament has the democratic mandate to 
decide what limits on rights are appropriate.141 It suggested enhancing this role by 
establishing a Select Committee with specific responsibility for human rights issues.142 
However, this suggestion could be taken a step further and require a Human Rights 
Select Committee to report on every bill which was introduced into Parliament which 
appears or has the potential to appear inconsistent with the rights contained in the 
NZBORA. This lower potential standard would ensure that personal values of the 
Judiciary would not influence an s 5 analysis.  
Additionally, it could be made explicit that s 5 is an exclusive consideration for 
Parliament.  This section would align with Chief Justice Elias’ minority judgment in 
Hansen and remove the potential to politicize the Judiciary. It would also ensure that s 6 
is always applied by the courts. 
This Select Committee would usurp the Attorney-General’s s 7 role, but provide a much 
better alternative. As discussed, the Attorney-General as part of the executive is not the 
appropriate party to be screening bills for compliance with rights. The composition of 
this panel would be important. It could not be dominated by the executive, or else it 
would be analogous to the Attorney-General. New Zealand’s mixed member 
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proportional system resulting in a diverse Legislature would ensure that the select 
committee make up would be well balanced politically.  
The Report also recommended caulking a s 7 loophole.143 Currently, s 7 applies only at 
the introduction of a Bill and is not applicable to Supplementary Order Papers.144  The 
Human Rights Select Committee could be required to review rights infringement during 
a bills entire passage through the House. 
The Report discussed the possibility of ‘double entrenchment’.145 Those in favour 
pointed to BORA’s precarious status and the fundamental importance of human 
rights.146 Those against entrenchment stressed the need for flexibility and that the 
barriers posed by an entrenched supreme law might become unworkable.147 Political 
rights theory stresses the possibility of change and would disapprove of entrenchment. 
It would inhibit the fluidity of the rights-discourse between the state and its subjects 
IX The CAP’s Proposed Additional Rights 
A NZBORA Current Catalogue of Rights 
It is helpful to examine the NZBORA’s current catalogue of rights in order to inform an 
analysis of those proposed by the CAP report. The drafters of the NZBORA drew upon: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, to which New Zealand is a 
party.148 Article 2 of this treaty requires parties to take legislative action which recognizes 
the rights within ICCPR. The long title of NZBORA confirms it was intended to affirm the 
ICCPR.149  However, Ronagh suggests that this reference to the ICCPR was included in 
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order to convince a public skeptical towards rights that the NZBORA was necessary to 
meet international obligations.150  
 
This could be perceived as an example of the government manufacturing the consent of 
the governed. In fact, the rights in the ICCPR and those in the NZBORA do not necessarily 
align.151 Most rights in NZBORA have corresponding articles to some extent in the 
ICCPR.152 But many rights enshrined in the ICCPR are omitted, such as a right to privacy, 
the right to be free from slavery and rights specific to children.153 For these omissions 
New Zealand has been criticized by the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee for failing to 
implement the Convention.154 The Committee also censured New Zealand for failing to 
give the NZBORA supreme status. 
 
The catalogue of rights is found in Part 2 of the NZBORA which is entitled, ‘Civil and 
Political Rights’.  The rights are separated into four categories: Life and Security of the 
Person; Democratic and Civil Rights; Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights; and Search, 
Arrest and Detention.  A distinct emphasis is placed on procedural rights rather than 
substantive rights.155 The parliamentary intention which can be gleaned from this 
procedural focus is clear: the rights were “designed to preserve the opportunity for 
political participation and decision making, rather than dictate substantive outcomes”.156  
 
Furthermore, none of these rights are novel to New Zealand law. The Judiciary has 
observed that rather than adding to procedural rights, the NZBORA is simply a formal 
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codification of pre-existing rights.157 The CAP Report notes this.158 This suggests further 
that the NZBORA was not intended to substantively alter the legal landscape. Any 
intentions of this nature were phased out during the passage through parliament.  
 
Karel Vasek’s categorization of rights into three distinct generations is a useful tool when 
comparing the rights current enshrined in NZBORA to those proposed in the CAP 
report.159 According this categorization, the first generation of rights are those basic civil 
and political rights forged by political struggles between the rulers and the ruled. The 
United States Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen are prime examples. The second generations of rights are those geared at equality 
through social, economic and cultural rights. They are exemplified by the implementation 
of socialist policies such as labour rights. The third generation of rights is still emerging. 
They are idealistic and target global issues such as intergenerational rights and 
environmental preservation. As such, they are seldom reflected in domestic law. 
 
The rights within the NZBORA are limited to the first generation; it is simply a mechanism 
to regulate the relationship between the state and its subjects. The rights proposed within 
the CAP belong to the second and third generation of rights. 
B The CAP’s Proposed Additional Rights 
As noted earlier, the degree which these proposed rights are supported does not go 
beyond a call for further discussion. Additionally, the CAP report does not examine the 
interaction between the proposals which would improve compliance with the standards 
set by the Act and the proposed additional rights. For example, if the NZBORA was to be 
granted supreme status and enact the proposed additional rights this would essentially 
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hand the keys of policy making over to the Judiciary. The effect of proposed additional 
rights will be examined in relation to their effect under the current NZBORA law.  
 
The role of s 5 and it is ability to limit rights where it is deemed justifiable is of particular 
concern. The proposed additional rights all have countervailing political justification 
meaning that s 5 could be readily engaged. The Report proposed economic, social and 
cultural rights aimed at reducing the wealth gap, ensuring essential needs are met, 
fostering a peaceful society, building communities and supporting economic 
development.160 Depending on political belief, these goals could be achieved in 
innumerable ways. Liberal policy might cite financial regulation as a means of reducing 
the wealth gap, whilst conservative policy will contest deregulation is the best avenue to 
overall economic progress. Similarly, cultural rights and peaceful communities might 
arguably be achieved either by assimilation or preservation of distinct diaspora. 
Additionally, these proposed rights would have to be protected through costly litigation. 
Due to resource asymmetry between the poor, rich and corporate entities; equal access 
to justice could be compromised. 
 
The Report considered enshrining some form of property right.161 This right appears 
relatively apolitical, but legislation which clearly defeats property rights might be justified 
by policy objectives. Consider government expropriation of petroleum.162 The original 
government expropriation of petroleum in 1937 was motivated by the prevailing belief 
that complete government control over petroleum was a necessary prerequisite to large-
scale oil production.163 Today, as privatization is deemed more efficient, other political 
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rationale justifies expropriation; such as ensuring collective gain instead of private 
windfalls. 
 
The Report considered the addition of environmental rights in a variety of forms: 
establishing obligations to protect the biosphere, affirming a human right to a healthy 
environment or intergenerational equity and a constitutional requirement to pursue 
sustainable development.164 In the vast majority of cases economic interests are contrary 
to environmental ones and could provide demonstrable justification when limiting any 
form of environmental right.  
 
The other proposed rights have similar countervailing policy interests. A right to privacy 
is opposed by law enforcement interests.165 The proposed indigenous right would be 
opposed by the rhetoric of ‘one law for all’.166 Equality itself was another mooted right.167 
In summary, numerous policy rationales could be invoked in order to argue that any limits 
to the right were justified per s 5. This would completely invalidate the rights. This could 
prove devastating to the public’s perception of the NZBORA. It would inspire a false 
expectation of rights which could be routinely limited. 
 
Another problem exists in relation to enshrining cultural and indigenous rights. In the 
midst of the debate in 1986 about whether or not New Zealand needed a supreme bill of 
rights, the few submissions to the Law Reform Select Committee which supported a bill 
of rights highlighted the need to protect minorities’ rights.168 Indeed, other factors which 
contributed to Palmer’s volt-face on a New Zealand bill of rights included the 
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“globalization of human rights” and “accelerating cultural diversity”.169 It was believed 
rights could help protect the new minorities which were emerging in New Zealand.  
 
However, a cultural relativist strain of the political rights identifies reveals a significant 
problem. Rights, as enshrined in legislation, reflect western values. Parallels can be drawn 
to Maori concerns over the proposals in 1986 to include the Treaty of Waitangi in the bill 
of rights. Enshrining treaty rights in a general statute concerned mainly with other issues 
would demean the Treaty’s importance and there was suspicion that the reasonable 
limitations provision would be applied by the Judiciary in way contrary to Maori 
interests.170 Similarly, cultural and indigenous rights could be applied in a manner which 
was contrary to the agenda of respective cultures and Maori people. The Judiciary lacks 
the demographic make up to apply these rights sensitively and in accordance with the 
interests they are purported to represent. 
 
X What makes a right legal? 
 
If the role of the Judiciary is eliminated by adopting a Human Rights Select Committee, 
then this will avoid the political objection of the political rights theorist: that law is politics 
carried on by other means. The establishment of a Human Rights Select Committee with 
a role comparable to s 7 and preventing judicial consideration of s 5 would ensure that 
politics do not enter the legal world.  
 
But where does this leave the philosophical objection of political rights theory; that rights 
amount to window dressing which conceals the political claims of individuals and groups? 
Even though the Judiciary is phased out, Parliament could still use rights for political 
purposes. This problem is mitigating by rejecting the CAP report’s proposed additional 
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rights and restricting the NZBORA’s catalogue of rights to the first generation of rights. 
This means that political parties will be prevented from using rights as a shortcut for policy 
which they are unable to convince the public to support. However, a question arises as to 
whether the first generation of rights, those of a procedural nature which protect 
fundamental civil and political freedoms, are vulnerable to the philosophical objection of 
political rights theory? An answer can be provided by briefly examining the differing 
philosophical justifications for enshrining rights. 
 
There are many different underlying values which justify the legal recognition of rights: 
moral, cultural, religious, political, utilitarian and so on. It can be argued that, like most 
modern western legislation enshrining rights, the NZBORA is underpinned by moral and 
liberal values. The NZBORA was intended to affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).171 The origin of the ICCPR is 
intricately linked to the Universal Declaration (‘UDHR’).172 The UDHR is “silent and 
ostensibly agnostic” on what its philosophical groundings are, presumably in a bid to avoid 
any disagreement which could jeopardize consensus about the validity and contents of 
the declaration.173 However, the drafting history and language of the UDHR suggests it 
was heavily influenced by moral and liberal theories.174 The moral justification simply 
asserts that for the sake of morality people should enjoy the protection of rights. For 
example, the right to life is inspired by the ethical principle that killing is wrong. Liberalism 
entrusts the state to protect individual autonomy to the extent it does not infringe the 
autonomy of others.175 This includes protecting the individual from state infraction. The 
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procedural focus of the NZBORA reflects the social contract between the Government and 
the New Zealand people.  
 
Natural Law and Positivism are the two dominant jurisprudential theories which explain 
what creates law. These two theories have differing views on the role which the moral 
and liberal values have in creating the rights contained in NZBORA.  The positivist position 
argues that “the existence and content of law depends on depends on social facts and not 
on its merits.”176 Accordingly, the rights in the NZBORA constitute law because simply 
because they gained passage through New Zealand parliament. A natural law theorist, on 
the other hand, would claim that the NZBORA was created because it reflects the 
meritorious principles of morality and liberalism. However, there are problems with both 
theories. The dangers of positivism were made abundantly clear by the way in which the 
Third Reich justified atrocities by referring to national law.177 On the other hand, natural 
law runs into the problem of moral relativity; for example natural law has been used to 
justify practices now universally recognized as evil such as slavery and denying woman 
the vote.178 
 
Ronald Dworkin offers a convenient middle ground between the two in the form of Legal 
Interpretivism.179 Interpretivism is focused on the way institutions, such as Parliament 
and the Judiciary, create law by reference to internal principles. It differs from positivism 
in that these principles are “screened and rejected or modified” to the extent that they 
conflict with certain basic moral principles of fairness or justice.180  
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An interpretivist lens can be applied to the NZBORA. It could be argued that the NZBORA 
reflects an example of overt and institutionalized legal interpretivism. The enshrined 
procedural rights can be couched as a codification of the internal moral and liberal 
principles which would otherwise guide legislation and common law. The operative 
sections, namely ss 6 and 7 require the relevant legal institutions, the Judiciary and 
parliament respectively, to take into account these principles. The fact the statute is 
unentrenched means that the internal principles (in the form of rights) are subject to 
change as values change. 
 
This view offers a response to the philosophical objection of political rights theory. The 
procedural rights within the NZBORA might well be perceived as political claims. However, 
they have become an inalienable part of western culture produced by the discourse 
between the rulers and the ruled. Even if the rights were not enshrined, the Legislature 
and Judiciary would draw upon the moral and liberal principles they represent when 
creating law. By codifying these principles in the form of rights, a more lucid and certain 
system is created. The public, politicians and judges are overtly informed of the principles 




Griffith’s political rights theory argues that rights amount to thinly veiled political claims 
and that the law, particularly the Judiciary, is just another avenue for pushing these 
political claims. The ambiguity of rights legislation helps to achieve this purpose. However, 
Griffith’s theory does not acknowledge the pivotal role which rights can play in 
negotiating power arrangements between the state and its subjects. This role is revealed 
by an application of the discourse thesis. The product of these negotiations is the first 
generation of rights; the procedural rights which protect fundamental civil and political 
rights. 
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The history of the NZBORA reveals that the public and academics alike shared Griffith’s 
cynicism towards rights. In response the concern that law is synonymous with politics, the 
Legislature attempted to reduce the role of the Judiciary in applying rights. However, this 
attempt was clumsily drafted resulting in the ss 4, 5 and 6 conundrum. This left a large 
amount of discretion available to the Judiciary. In Hansen the majority of the Supreme 
Court exploited this discretion and established an active judicial role in assessing the limits 
to rights. However, this role can only be performed in the event of litigation which 
compromised equal access to justice. The alternative check on limits of rights, s 7, was 
performed by a member of the executive, who had the discretion to exercise this role on 
the basis of his or her own political opinion. 
 
The CAP report contains several proposals which have the ability to remedy this problem. 
The most preferable is the establishment of a Human Rights Select Committee. This would 
provide an impartial check on limitations to rights and ensure that the judiciary is not 
politicized in the process. It would also guarantee equal access to justice is not 
compromised. The CAP report’s proposed additional rights should be rejected on the 
grounds that they could be perceived as thinly veiled political claims. Conversely, the 
current catalogue of rights contained in NZBORA can be defended on the basis that they 
effectively negotiate the relationship between the state and its subjects by protecting civil 
and political freedoms. Furthermore, they make explicit the values underlying the 
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